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A federal district court holds distributor's failure to
maintain manufacturer's quality control standards
possible violation of federal trademark law
by PaulLukitsch

In Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
904 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1995), a United States
district court held that a distributor's unauthorized sale
of date-expired products could infringe a brewer's
trademark under federal trademark laws. In addition, in
reviewing the distributor's motion to dismiss the
brewer's claims, the court held that the "economic loss
rule," a rule under Florida law which prevents a tort
action from being maintained on purely economic
damages, does not bar a brewer's fraud claim where
damages include damages to the brewer's trademark.
Since May 1, 1983, Anthony Distributors ("Anthony") has been engaged in distributor agreements with
Miller Brewing Company ("Miller"). These agreements
grant Anthony the exclusive right to distribute Miller
products, which bear the registered trademark of Miller,
in the Tampa Bay and St. Petersburg markets of Florida.
According to the terms set forth in the distributor
agreements, Anthony is required to uphold Miller's strict
quality control standards by preventing Miller products
with expired date codes from reaching consumers. To
ensure this control, Anthony must retrieve overage
products from all retail accounts and destroy the product
at their own expense.
Miller alleged that Anthony failed to comply with
the required quality control standards set forth in the
distributor agreements despite repeated warnings. Miller
insisted that Anthony's failure to comply with these
standards was due in part to a scheme by Anthony to
generate profits. Miller took the position that Anthony,
through its representatives, intended to fraudulently
deliver overage products to retail accounts by "slamming, swapping, and dumping" the overage products to
increase sales. Miller believed that Anthony's failure to
comply with the quality control standards affected
Miller's ability to exercise control over products bearing
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the Miller trademark. Miller alleged that Anthony's sale
of overage products damaged the goodwill of the Miller
trademark and allowed Anthony to earn profits to which
it was not entitled. Miller further alleged that Anthony
breached the distributor agreement, thereby causing
financial losses to Miller.
On May 8, 1995, Miller filed a seven count action in
the district court against Anthony, alleging breach of
contract, trademark infringement under federal law,
fraud, and unjust enrichment. In response to these
claims, Anthony filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
the economic loss doctrine barred Miller's tort claim of
fraud because Miller had only sustained pecuniary
damages but no property damages. Anthony further
contended that federal trademark law did not apply
because Anthony was an "authorized distributor"
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court looks
only to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint and
accepts all allegations as true. Here, the district court
allowed the claim based on federal trademark law,
holding that Anthony's status as an authorized distributor offered no protection from trademark infringement.
In addition, although Anthony sold genuine Miller
products bearing the registered Miller trademark rather
than an imitation or counterfeit product, the court held
that Anthony's failure to follow Miller's quality controls
rendered the product not genuine. Thus, the court found
Anthony's sale of Miller's products without following
the quality controls to be an infringement of Miller's
registered trademark. The court also held that by
suffering damage to their registered trademark, an
intangible asset, Miller suffered damage to property.
Therefore, the court found the "economic loss rule"
inapplicable and allowed Miller's fraud claims to stand.
However, the court denied Miller's unjust enrichment
claim pursuant to the "economic loss rule," noting that
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the damages for the breach of contract and the unjust
enrichment claims were identical.

Genuine Miller Beer no longer genuine
Anthony maintained that the federal trademark laws,
the substantive basis for Miller's counts of trademark
infringement, did not apply because of Anthony's status
as an "authorized distributor" of Miller's products and
because the contractual remedies available to Miller
subsumed this claim.
The court looked to 15 U.S.C. § 1114, which states in
part: "Any person who shall, without the consent of the
registrant (a) use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale ... of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion.., shall be liable in a civil
action by the registrant.. .." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). The
court evaluated Miller's allegation of trademark infringement under federal law by focusing on two
elements of the statute. First, there must be a lack of
consent by the owner of the registered trademark with
regard to its use in commerce. Second, the product in
question must be in the form of a reproduction or copy;
trademark law does not apply to genuine products
bearing the true mark of the registrant.
The court rejected Anthony's argument that its status
as an "authorized distributor" of Miller products
prevented it from being liable for trademark infringement. The court found that Anthony clearly lacked
consent; further, the court held that there is nothing in
the body of federal trademark law that would immunize
Anthony from trademark infringement merely because
of its status. In fact, the statute in question states that the
actor may be "any person."
The court found Anthony's actions within the scope
of the statute, with respect to the statutory requirement
that the product be in the form of an imitation or copy.
After discussing applicable case law, the court concluded that a product is not genuine unless it is manufactured and distributed under the quality controls established by the manufacturer. One purpose of a trademark
is to serve as a quality assurance mechanism; thus, the
trademark is associated with the quality of the product it
symbolizes. In failing to maintain the standards established by Miller in selling Miller products to consumers,
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the court concluded that Anthony violated the owner's
trademark and infringed Miller's trademark under
federal law. The court also noted that 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1) has been liberally construed and does not
require literal interpretation of the terms "reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation... 2' This
interpretation prevents misappropriation of the goodwill
associated with the trademark, which may adversely
affect the trademark owner and influence the public.
Therefore, the court rejected Anthony's argument
and held that Miller may be entitled to cumulative
damages resulting from the infringement of Miller's
trademark as well as damages flowing from the breach
of contract claim.

"Economic Loss Rule" does not bar the
tort claim of fraud
Anthony also moved for a dismissal of Miller's fraud
claim based on the "economic loss rule." The economic
loss rule bars any tort claim that is brought solely on the
basis of economic damages. In addition, where an
alleged breach of contract claim and a tort claim are
brought under the same underlying facts and where the
alleged tort does not cause harm distinct from that
caused by the breach of contract, a plaintiff is barred
from bringing a separate tort action.
Miller alleged that Anthony, by failing to follow
Miller's strict quality control standards and fraudulently
passing the products on to retailers under the Miller
name, damaged the goodwill of Miller's trademark.
Miller contended that a trademark is an intangible asset
of a corporation and, as such, is Miller's property.
Therefore, because Miller suffered property damage and
economic damage from the alleged contractual breach,
the court denied Anthony's motion to dismiss and
sustained Miller's fraud claim.

Unjust enrichment claim denied
In contrast, the court dismissed Miller's unjust
enrichment claim based on the economic loss doctrine.
In this case, the court held that Miller did not allege any
damages to the goodwill of its trademark which would
constitute a separate damage to property. Therefore, the
court barred Miller's unjust enrichment claim under the
"economic loss rule."
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New Jersey hospital not liable under state
Consumer Fraud Act
by Thomas O'Connor
In Hampton Hospitalv. Bresan,
672 A.2d 725, (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1996), the Superior Court
of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
held that the parents of a child who
received psychiatric treatment at
Hampton Hospital ("Hampton")
could not sue Hampton under
provisions of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act ("Act").
Hampton initiated the suit in an
attempt to collect the balance of an
unpaid bill from the defendants,
Joseph and Lynn Bresan
("Bresans"). The bill was for
psychiatric treatment of the Bresans'
suicidal teenage son. The Bresans
filed a counterclaim, maintaining
that Hampton violated the Act
during the course of treatment of
their son.

Hospital denied request
for early discharge
Lawrence Bresan, the defendants'
seventeen-year-old son, attempted
suicide by ingesting a large dose of
sleeping pills in May of 1991.
Lawrence's mother admitted him to
a hospital for treatment. After
physical recovery, Lawrence began
out-patient psychiatric treatment.
During this treatment, his psychiatrist suggested that Lawrence enter a
thirty day in-patient program at
Hampton. Successful completion of
Hampton's program was designed to
last thirty days-if the patient entered
on a voluntary basis and if the
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patient was judged fit to be for
discharge at the end of that period.
The health insurance policy of
Lawrence's mother would cover her
son's stay for up to thirty days, but
she remained responsible for paying
the deductible. The Bresans decided
to admit Lawrence on May 12,
1991.
During the admitting process,
Lawrence and his parents signed a
Voluntary Admission Notice which
included a clause stating that "[aIll
voluntary patients have the right to
request discharge," but reserved the
following clause for the hospital:
"Upon receipt of the notice,
Hampton staff have 48 hours
to assess the patient's condition and make appropriate
plans for discharge or continued treatment. If the patient's
condition so warrants,
Hampton staff may seek
involuntary commitment."
Despite making encouraging
progress at the start of his treatment,
Lawrence decided to terminate the
program after three weeks in order
to spend his birthday at home.
Hampton's policy regarding early
discharge from this program
mandates a written or oral request to
one of the program's staff fortyeight hours in advance of discharge.
Lawrence complied with this rule,
but his request for a discharge was
met with resistance on the part of the

staff. Over the course of the next
twenty-four hours, the staff persuaded Lawrence to withdraw his
request for discharge and continue
the program as scheduled. This
discussion occurred without the
consent or knowledge of the
Bresans. Lawrence was released
thirty days after his admittance to
the in-patient program.
The preceding facts are not
disputed by either party. Hampton's
cause of action arose because the
Bresans did not pay the full amount
owed to the hospital. According to
the Bresans, Hampton coerced
Lawrence into staying the full thirty
days in order to exhaust their
insurance coverage; the Bresans
argued that the hospital staff applied
a revenue maximizing formula to
determine Lawrence's discharge
date. Hampton denied the accusation
and maintained that the hospital
retained Lawrence for thirty days
under the specified duration of the
program. Hampton further contended that it would have discharged
Lawrence early had its diagnosis
deemed an early discharge to be
appropriate.
After unsuccessful attempts to
collect payment, Hampton brought
suit in Cape May County Special
Civil Part. The Bresans successfully
removed the suit to the Law Division and filed a counterclaim,
maintaining that Hampton engaged
in consumer fraud contrary to the
Act. Once in the Law Division,
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